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Abstract  
The  socio-­‐‑cultural  production  of  architects’  identities,  and  their  professional  personas,  
is   a   lively   source   of   continuing   debate.   At   one   extreme,   there   is   the   claim   to  
autonomy   that   highlights   the   distinctiveness   of   architecture   and   its   cultural   and  
disciplinary  specificity.  This  view   is  challenged  by   those  who  emphasise  architects’  
dependence,   for   acting   and   actions,   on   their   embeddedness   into   collective,   social,  
settings   and   relationships.   In   the   paper,   we   consider   what   it   may   mean   to   be  
‘autonomous  of’  and  ‘dependent  on’  in  relation  to  the  actions  of  architects.  There  is  
limited  specification  in  architectural  writings  about  what  autonomy  and  dependence  
are,   and   we   suggest   that   there   is   a   need   not   to   discount   such   terms,   but   to  
reformulate  them  by  recognising  that  the  socially  constructed  self  is  an  integral  part  
of  individual  action.  In  this  respect,  we  seek  to  amplify,  and  evaluate,  the  concept  of  
relational   autonomy   that   distances   the   notion   of   autonomy   from   individualistic,  
under-­‐‑socialised,   accounts   of   architects   and   their   practices.   Referring   to   three  
empirical  examples  of  practice,  we  amplify   this  understanding  by,   firstly,  outlining  
what  a  relational  autonomous  approach  to  architecture  might  entail,  and,  secondly,  
assessing  how   far   it  may  enable   a   conception  of   the  practices  of   architects   in  ways  
whereby,   following   Tony   Fry’s   observations,   they   are   conceived   as   much   broader  









	   3	  
(1).  Introduction.  
  
This   paper   is   a   reflection   on   a   period   of   research   and   writing   about   architecture  
where,  more  often  than  not,  we  have  been  perceived  as  outsiders  and  not  qualified  to  
comment   on   the   activities   and   actions   of   architects.   In   one   instance,   a   referee   of   a  
book  proposal  we  wrote,  about  the  interrelationships  between  architectural  practice  
and  regulation,   said   that  our  peripheral   status,  as  non-­‐‑architects,  was  such   that   the  
subject   matter   was   ‘the   kind   of   thing   that   only   an   architect   could   write   about  
incisively’.1   Another   referee   questioned   the   methodological   basis   of   the   book  
proposal,   in   particular,   the   perception   of   its   grounding   in   our   ‘outsider   status’   as  
social  scientists,  by  saying  that  ‘I  distrust  non-­‐‑designers  who  try  to  reach  conclusions  
about   the   design  process   from  questionnaires   that   they   themselves   have  devised’.2  
While   these   comments   seemed   anachronistic   to   us,   they   were   reminders   of   the  
continuing   importance,   and   power,   of   disciplinary   knowledge   in   the   crafting   of  
architects  individual  and  collective  values  and  identities.      
  
The   (re)  production  of  architects’   identities,  and  their  professional  personas,   is  well  
documented  in  the  literature.  3  At  one  extreme,  there  is  the  claim  to  autonomy  that,  in  
Eisenman’s   terms,   conceives   architecture   as   ‘a   representation   of   itself,   of   its   own  
values   and   internal   experience’.4   Such   sentiments   highlight   the   distinctiveness   of  
architecture   and   its   cultural   and   disciplinary   specificity.   For   Gondalsonas,   this   is  
reflected  in  the  transcendent  nature  of  architectural  knowledge,  ‘a  force  in  itself…and  
which   does   not   communicate   ideas   other   than   its   own’.5   This   view   projects   an  
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atomistic  model  of  human  agency  and  interaction,  and  it  is  challenged  by  those  who  
suggest  that  ‘architecture  depends’.6  Instead  of  the  autonomy  of  architecture,  and  the  
moral  and  ethical  distancing  of  architects  from  the  objects/subjects  of  their  practices,  
what   is   emphasised   is   practitioners’   dependence,   for   acting   and   actions,   on   social  
relationships   and   competing   discourses   about  what   design   and   building   processes  
are  or  ought  to  be.    
  
The   counterpoising   of   autonomy   and   dependence   maintains   a   dualism   that   is  
unhelpful   in  developing  knowledge  of/about   the  actions  of  architects.   In   the  paper,  
we   draw   on,   and   develop,   debates   that   reject   an   either/or   position   and,   instead,  
interrogate  what  it  means  to  be  ‘autonomous  of’  and  ‘dependent  on’.  There  is  limited  
specification   in   architectural,   and   cognate,   writings   about   what   autonomy   and  
dependence   are,   and,   following   Christman7,   there   is   a   need   not   to   discount   such  
terms,  but  to  reformulate  them  by  recognising  that  the  socially  constructed  self  is  an  
integral  part  of   individual  action.   In   this  respect,  we  seek   to  amplify,  and  evaluate,  
the   concept   of   relational   autonomy   that   distances   the   notion   of   autonomy   from  
individualistic,  under-­‐‑socialised,  accounts  of  architects  and  their  practices.  This  may  
facilitate  the  development  of  a  conception  of  human  agency  in  which  the  capacities  
and   opportunities   for   autonomous   action   are,   as   Christman8   suggests,  
‘fundamentally  and  irreducibly  relational’.  
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Instead   of   being   shackled   by   a   disciplinary   knowledge,   underpinned   by   the   pre-­‐‑
occupation   with   instrumentalism   and   aestheticisation,   a   relational   autonomy   of  
architecture   can   enable   the   excavation   of   what   Fry9   refers   to   as   the   ‘being   of   the  
building’.  This  ‘being’  is  inextricably  part  of  the  spatial-­‐‑temporal  relations  of  design  
and   building   practices,   the   substance   of   which   has   the   potential   to   highlight   the  
political,   and  moral,   content   of   the  design  process,   and   the,   intrinsically,   socialised  
and  geographical  nature  (s)  of  the  practices  of  architects.  In  the  rest  of  the  paper,  we  
amplify   this   understanding   by,   firstly,   outlining   what   a   relational   autonomous  
approach  to  architecture  might  entail,  and,  secondly,  assessing  how  far  it  may  enable  
a  conception  of  the  practices  of  architects  in  ways  whereby,  following  Fry10,  they  are  
conceived   as   much   broader   than   ‘the   specificity   of   any   particular   activity’   that  
expresses  their  existence.    
  
(2).  Towards  relational  autonomies  and  the  socialisation  of  architects.  
  
One  of  the  persistent,  socio-­‐‑political  and  ideological,   features  of  western  societies   is  
the  persona  of  individuals  as  autonomous  agents,  acting  more  or  less  independently  
of   social   relationships,   and   loosely   held   together   by   voluntary   ties.11   This   is   the  
projection   of   what   the   feminist   writer   Jennifer   Nedelsky12   describes   as   ‘the   liberal  
vision   of   human   beings   as   self-­‐‑made   and   self-­‐‑making   men’.   Such   features   are  
redolent  of  the  values  of  many  professional  organisations,  intent  on  developing  their  
members’   social   and   cultural   status   by   highlighting   their   distinctive,   and   unique,  
attributes   and   qualities.   Here,   the   emphasis   is   the   interior   qualities   that   are  
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significant   in   delimiting   a   profession’s   boundaries,   defined,   in   part,   by   its   subject-­‐‑
specific   foci   and   claims   to   a   disciplinary   specificity.   Such   specificity   is   part   of   the  
basis  of/for  personal  autonomy,  defined  by  Christman13  as  behaviour  that   is  able  to  
facilitate  a  person’s  ‘true’  or  ‘authentic’  self.  
  
There  is  wide  documentation  about  architects  and  the  authentic  self,  characterized  by  
the  heroic  figure  and  the  understanding  of  their  craft  as  the  design  and  production  of  
aesthetic   objects14.   It   is   assumed   that   the   locale   or   context   for   design   activity   is   a  
tabula   rasa,   a   blank-­‐‑slate  metaphor   that   serves   to   highlight   the   critical   role   of   the  
architect’s  mental   and   intellectual   capacities   in   crafting   new   environments15.   These  
are  based  on  the  search  for  beauty,  or  what  Leon  Alberti16,  in  his  architectural  treatise,  
conveys   as   the   pursuit   of   ‘firm   and   graceful   preordering   of   lines   and   angles  
conceived  in  the  mind’.  This  pursuit  is  the  interlinking  of  architects’  autonomy  with  
images   and   representations   based   on   a   Cartesian   conception   of   space,   in   which  
spatial   relations   are   ‘inside   the   forms   –   the   interior’.17   The   object   of   the   architect’s  
practice   is  understood  as   the  building,  or  a  physical   space   that  expresses   the  art  of  
architecture   through   its   visual   elements,   from   the   form   of   its   façades   to   the  
decorative  details  of  doors  and  windows.  
  
The   autonomous   field  of   architecture   is   contested  by   alternative   ideas   that   suggest  
that   the   actions   of   architects   are   shaped  by  heteronomy,  defined   by   the   social   and  
cultural   contexts   in   which   practice   is   manifest.18   Here,   Leon   Alberti’s19   classical  
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conception   of   architecture,   as   the   perspective   of   ‘whole   forms   in   the   mind’,   is  
supplanted   by   socio-­‐‑cultural   and   materialist   understandings   of   the   actions   of  
architects.   These   range   from   conceptions   of   architects’   actions   as   derivative   of  
impersonal,   economic,   forces,   to   the   understanding   that   architecture   is,   in  Michael  
Hays20  terms,  ‘an  instrument  of  cultural  values’.  In  both  interpretations,  the  scope  for  
architects   to   exercise   (self)   control,   that   is,   the   possibilities   for   socialized   forms   of  
autonomy,   is   denied   by   conceptions   that   regard   architects’   practices   as   an  
epiphenomenon,   dependent   on,   and   derivative   of,   prevailing   socio-­‐‑economic,  
technological,  and  political  relations.  
  
Neither  the  asocial  notion  of  autonomy  nor  the  structural,  materialist,  conception  of  
architects’  practices  as  epiphenomena  are  tenable  in  facilitating  an  understanding  of  
the  actions  of  architects.  Both  are  limited  by  conceiving  architecture  as  part  of  a  linear  
process  of  cause  and  effect,  bound  by  a  functionality  that,  as  Fry21  suggests,   fails   to  
“perceive   ‘space   in   action’   or   as   ‘lived’”.22  The   ‘lived’   nature   of   architecture   is   one  
whereby   designed   artifacts   are   not   ends   in   themselves,   but   are   redolent   of   fluid  
relationships   co-­‐‑constituted   by   the   contingencies   of   time   and   place.   Jacobs   et   al23  
suggest  similar  by  encouraging  scholars  to  look  beyond  the  building  to  the  ‘diverse  
gatherings   of   contingently   formed   associates   and   associations’,   a   sentiment   that  
draws  attention  to  the  connectivity  of  phenomena,  or  the  understanding  of  architects’  
practices  as   constituted  by   ‘mutual,  partial,  or   contingent  dependencies’.24  This   is  a  
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rejection   of   conceptual   dichotomies   and   of   architects’   actions   as   part   of   a   closed,  
interiorized,  system.  
  
The  significance  of  these  perspectives  is  the  challenge  to,  and  potential  displacement  
of,  reductive  claims  to  autonomy  that  fail  to  situate  the  autonomous  self  within  what  
Elias25  describes  as  ‘the  structure  of  the  relations  between  individuals’.  This  is  not  to  
diminish   the   architect,   or   their   capacity   to   act   and   influence,   but,   rather,   to   situate  
them,  and  their  actions,   in  what  Christman26  characterises  as   ‘relational  experiences  
as   an   integral   part   of   individual   actions’.   Architects,   or   any   professional,   are   not  
disconnected   from   social   contexts,   and   are   co-­‐‑constituted   by   their   emplacement   in  
networks   or   what   Hunt   and   Ells27   describe   as   ‘indefinite   sets   of   multiple  
connections…that   inform   and   shape   what   is   connected’.   Thus,   unlike   the   static  
conception  of  the  autonomous  practitioner,  which  emphasizes  the  separateness  of  the  
architect,   relational   accounts   consider   autonomy   to   be   constituted   through,   and,  
crucially,  enhanced  by,  the  collective  interactions  with  other  actors,  and  by  the  social  
contexts  in  which  such  interactions  unfold.    
  
Here,   autonomy   is   part   of   a   social   process   in   which   to   exercise   agency,   and   self-­‐‑
determination,   depends   on   the   recognition   of   one’s   embeddedness   into   collective  
social  formations  whose  operating  may  be  ‘a  source  of  autonomy  as  well  as  a  danger  
to  it’28.  This  (relational)  view  of  autonomy  highlights  how  the  architect  is  positioned  
in   relation   to   other   (networks   of)   actors,   their   resources   and   systems   of   knowledge  
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and  practice.  This  is  not  to  regard  autonomy  as  freedom  from  constraint  but  rather,  
in  Perkin  et  al’s29  terms,  as  a  fluid  process  that  enables  an  actor’s  sense  of  self  to  be  
developed   and   exercised,   ‘and   reconfirmed   in   context   to   daily   interactions   and  
experiences’.   In  methodological   terms,   this   understanding,   of   what   constitutes   the  
persona  of  the  architect,   leads  to  less  of  a  focus  on  the  building  as  a  representation,  
and  more  on  what  Lees30  describes  as  ‘the  active  and  embodied  (design)  practices  by  
which  it  is  produced,  appropriated  and  inhabited’31  
    
Such   ideas  direct   attention   to   the   transactional   nature   of   knowledge,   and   emphasise  
the   constitutive   nature   of   individuals’   practices   and   actions.   Such   thinking   is  
influential  in  spatial  disciplines,  such  as  planning  and  geography,  and,  as  Jones32  notes,  
relational   approaches   reject   both   absolute   and   relative   conceptions   of   space   since,  
‘objects   are   space,   space   is   objects,   and  moreover   objects   can   be   understood   only   in  
relation   to   other   objects’.   The   importance   of   relationality   is   also   recognised   in   some  
practice   and   professional   contexts,   and   Edwards’ 33   call,   for   a   ‘relational   turn   in  
expertise’,   is   recognition   that  professionals,   such  as  architects,  work   ‘in  and  between  
work   settings   and   interact   with   other   practitioners   and   clients   to   negotiate  
interpretation   of   tasks   and   ways   of   accomplishing   them’.   For   Edwards34,   expert   or  
professional  knowledge   is  not   the  preserve  of  any  group,  but   it   is  distributed  across  
social   systems,   and   necessitates   new   configurations   of   practice   that   ‘may   destabilise  
established  pathways  of  collaboration’.  
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These  observations  draw  attention  to  the  shaping  of  architects’  sense  of  self  through  
practice,  or  what  Kimbell35  refers  to  as  design-­‐‑as-­‐‑practice  and  designs-­‐‑in-­‐‑practice.  These  
concepts  convey  an  understanding  of  practice  in  relation  to  what  people  do  in  their  
everyday   interactions   with   each   other,   and   with   material   objects   and   non-­‐‑human  
artifacts.  Design-­‐‑as-­‐‑practice  directs  attention  to  the  embodied  nature  of  design  and  the  
‘habitual,   possibly   rule   governed,   often   routinised,   conscious,   or   unconscious’,  
nature  of  practices36.  Far  from  a  rational,  problem  solving  activity,  or  the  preserve  of  
a  heroic  figure,  design-­‐‑as-­‐‑practice  is  characterised  by  material  and  discursive  activities  
that   constitute   the   basis   of   the  practices   of   architects.   Such  practices,   including   the  
development  of  a  design  for  a  building,  are  dependent  on  what  Reckwitz37  describes  
as   the   existence   and   specific   interconnections   of   the   elements   that   comprise   them,  
‘and  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  any  of  these  single  elements’.  
  
Designs-­‐‑in-­‐‑practice   is  the  understanding  that  designing  is  never  complete  or  finished  
but  is  part  of  emergent  activities  that  may  become  transparent  as  they  are  enacted  in-­‐‑
practice.   Such   practices   are   not   reducible   to   a   specific   knowledge   or   practice-­‐‑type,  
and   designing   is   much  more   than   the   activities   of   those   ascribed   as   designers,   or  
(their)  actions  defined  as  part  of  a  delimited,  discrete,  process.  As  Tony  Fry38  suggests,  
designing   is   integral   to   pre-­‐‑figured   human   activity,   including   the   everyday  
inhabitation   of   space   by   what   Lucy   Kimbell39  describes   as   both   known   users   and  
those  who  are  not  known.  Designs-­‐‑in-­‐‑practice  specifies  the  ordinariness  of  designing,  
the  multiplicity  of   those   involved   in   it,   and   the   crafting  of   architects   autonomy,  or  
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sense  of  self,  as  part  of  a  dynamic  of  situated  and  contingent  practice.  We  now  turn  
to  consider  how  far,  and  in  what  ways,  architects’  practices  are  interconnected  to  the  
multiplicity   of   contingent   things,   the   inter   dependencies   of  which,  we   suggest,   are  
significant  in  shaping  the  practices  of  architecture.  
    
(3).  Design  (s)  as/in  practice  and  relational  autonomies.  
  
To   develop,   empirically,   our   observations   about   architecture,   autonomy,   and  
relationality,   we   refer   to   three   contrasting   practical   contexts   that   illustrate   the  
potential   for  design-­‐‑in-­‐‑practice  and  designs-­‐‑as-­‐‑practice  to  shape,  and  be  shaped  by,  
the   (relational)   autonomies   of   architects.   The   first   relates   to   the   interrelationships  
between   pedagogy   and   practice   in   which   the   scope   for   architects’   autonomy   is  
enhanced,   potentially,   by   their   acculturation   into   practice-­‐‑based   discourses   that  
underpin   the   techniques   of   building   and   construction.   The   second   considers  
architects’  interactions  with  building  users,  not  as  essentialised  categories  or  objects,  
but  as  embodied,  living,  subjects  that  are  co-­‐‑constitutive  of  design  practice.  The  third  
is  legal  rule  and  regulation  of  design  practice  by  planning  and  building  control  that,  
in  distinction  to  orthodox  assumptions  that  conceives  regulatory  control  as  anathema  
to   freedom,   may   be   the   basis   for   enlarging   building   quality   and   the   scope   of   the  
(relational)  autonomies  of  the  architect.    
  
To   illustrate  our  arguments,  we  draw  on,  selectively,  data  generated  from  a  range  of  
different   research   projects   conducted   between   2000   and   2011,   each   dealing   with  
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different   dimensions   of   architects’   influence   on   the   design   process.40  The   projects  
deployed   a   range   of   research  methods,   including   interviews  with   architects,   project  
managers,  building  control  surveyors,  engineers,  and  other  personnel  involved  in  the  
design   and   construction   of   buildings.   We   particularly   draw   on   architects’   (self)  
testimonies   as   illustrations   of   the   various   ways   in   which   they   understand   their  
practices,   often   articulated   as   part   of   a   relational   matrix   whereby   their   scope   for  
(autonomous)  action  and  practice  is  predicated,  precisely,  on  their  entwinement  with,  
and   dependence   on,   others.   Documentary   material   was   also   gathered,   including    
photographs,   drawings,   and   plans;   in   one   project,   which   we   briefly   refer   to   in   this  
paper,  archival  data,  relating  to  the  architecture  of  the  American  architect,  Frank  Lloyd  
Wright  were  gathered.41  
  
(a).  Architectural  knowledge  and  the  relevance  of  architecture.  
  
The  acculturation  of  architects   into   the  profession  of  architecture   is  anathema   to   free  
thinking   and   autonomy   because   it   restricts,   potentially,   the   scope   and   scale   of  
experience,  and  delimits,  by  managing  the  boundaries  of  the  ‘architect’s  field’,  what  is,  
or  ought   to  be,  permissible  practice.  This   is   recognised  by  a   range  of   commentators,  
including   Doucet   and   Janssens 42 ,   who   suggest   that   architecture’s   relevance   is  
threatened  by  its  introspective,  disciplinary,  tendencies,  or  what  Perez  Gomez43  refers  
to   as   the   retreat   into   ‘self-­‐‑referential,   structural   determinism’.   For   Doucet   and  
Janssens44,   the  danger   is   that  architecture   ‘has   isolated   itself   inside   its  black  box,  has  
progressively  internalised  discourse,  and  has  put  its  entire  focus  on  the  building  and  
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technology’.   This   is,   for   Jenson45,   akin   to   architects’   voluntary   ‘withdrawal   from   the  
social  realm’,  in  the  pursuit  of  a  false  sense  of  autonomy,  and  leading  some  observers  
to   view   architects   as   the   purveyors   of   fanciful   and   unreasonable   ideas   that  may   be  
irrelevant  to  the  building  process46.  
  
The   risk  of   the  architectural  profession  becoming  a   residual  element  of  building  and  
construction   is   acknowledged,   albeit   belatedly,   by   professional   bodies   such   as   the  
Royal  Institution  of  Architects  (RIBA)47.  The  RIBA48  highlight  the  ‘erosion  of  traditional  
architectural  skills  to  other  players’,  and  the  need  for  skills  acquisition  and  training  to  
reflect  the  heterogeneous  nature  of  building  and  design.  Similar  observations  are  part  
of  a  recent  government  review  of  architects’  education49,  which  calls  for  an  overhaul  of  
the   disciplinary   basis   of   architectural   training   in   favour   of   inter-­‐‑disciplinarity.   The  
review  seems  to  suggest  that  architects’  education,  in  its  present  form,  is  antithetical  to  
autonomy  because  what  is  taught,  including  its  manner  of  delivery  and  governance  by  
accreditation,  may   reinforce   architects   separation   from   the  world50.   Such   separations  
ought  not  to  be  confused  with  autonomy  because  the  implication,  of  separation,  is  the  
potential  side  lining  of  architects  in  the  production  of  the  designed  environment.  
  
Despite  the  recent  observations  by,  and  protestations  of,  the  RIBA,  the  distancing  of  
architects   from   ‘the   nature   of   construction’,   or   the   manifold   contexts   of   building  
practice,   is   related,   in  part,   to   the  boundary-­‐‑policing   role   of  professional   institutes.  
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Here,  processes  of  accreditation,  in  defining  what  legitimate  architectural  knowledge  
is,   can   be   implicated   in   restrictive   practice,   and   inhibit   relational   autonomies   (of  
architecture)   from   emerging.   This  was   the   view   of   an   architect  who,   in   interview,  
expressed  disquiet  with  the  policing  of  the  Urbanism  Group  within  the  RIBA.  As  he  
recalled,   ‘what   was   impeding   its   progress   was   the   fact   the   RIBA   made   it   more  
difficult  for  us  to  bring  people  in  on  an  equal  standing  from  the  other  disciplines  that  
are  very  much  involved  in  urbanism’.  Others  felt  that  boundary  policing  was  evident  
to  the  detriment  of  a  broader  knowledge  base  emerging  in  design  education,  or  as  an  
architect  said,  ‘I  find  the  RIBA  irrelevant  in  that  respect.  It’s  a  terrible  thing  to  say’.  
  
These   observations   resonate   with   many   architects   and,   in   interviews   we   have  
conducted,   there   is  more   or   less   unanimity   that   architects’   education,   including   its  
regulation   by   the   RIBA   and   the   professional   discourses   it   imbibes,   contributes   to  
inhibiting   autonomy  of   practice.  As   an   architect   said,   ‘my   education  was   instilling  
the  creative  impulse,  so  I  learnt  a  lot  about  art  history  but  not  much  of  practical  use’.  
This  reflects  the  problematical  assumption  that  architects’  autonomy  is  facilitated  by  
the  inculcation  of  distinction  or  what  Weingart51  describes  as  the  ‘disciplinary  criteria  
of  validity’.  One  architect  suggested  that  the  pursuit  of  validity  was  ‘a  diversion’.  He  
referred  to  computer-­‐‑aided  design  (CAD)  as  an  example,  a  technology  and  technique  
that  he   felt  was  reinforcing  a   focus  on   form,  and  not  enabling  an  understanding  of  
‘how  a  building  is  put  together’.  For  another  architect,  CAD  creates  a  false  sense  of  
space   or   no   sense   of   how   spaces   will   perform:   ‘it   discourages   dialogue   in   a  
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team…they   {trainee   architects]   can   use   the   computer,   no   problem…but   when   it  
comes  to  putting  the  elements  together  of  the  building  ...they’re  hopeless’.    
  
These  views  reflect  experienced  architects  who  are  ‘street-­‐‑wise’  in  relation  to  what  it  
takes   to   make   a   building.   One   interviewee   referred   to   practical   engagement   as  
requiring   architects   to   acquire,   necessarily,   the   bodily   dispositions   of   other,  
significant,  actors  in  the  design  process,  partly  by  self-­‐‑management  to  overcome  the  
potential  for  negative  comment  or  questioning  of  their  competence.  As  he  observed,  
part  of  the  process  is  to  fit  in  and  ‘get  on  with  the  [project]  team  and  show  them  that  
you’re   knowledgeable   about   their   point   of   view,   their   way   of   seeing   things’.   For  
another   architect,   gaining   credibility   and   enhancing,   potentially,   scope   for  
influencing   practice   depends,   in   part,   on   acquiring   the   skills   to   understand,   and  
communicate,   the   interdisciplinary   nature   of   building.   As   he   said,   ‘I   think   it’s  
important   that   you   have   a   level   of   understanding   of   all   the   issues   involved   in  
designing  a  building,  even  if  you  need  to  employ  consultants  to  get  specific  technical  
input…you  can  only  influence  others  if  you  can  speak  their  language’.    
  
For  architects,  by  blending  in,  and  developing  a  dialogue  with  project  team  members,  
the  propensity  for   ‘self  development’   is  enhanced,  or,  as  an  architect  suggested,  the  
key  to  getting  good  work  done  is  to   ‘talk  with  fellow  professionals…our  clients  are  
very  knowledgeable…so,  you  know,  we  learn  from  them  as  well’.  Another  architect  
felt   that,  whatever   he  was   being   directed   to   do   by   a   client,   that   the   quality   of   the  
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outcome   depended   on   him   listening   to,   and   empathising   with,   other   project  
professionals,  and  acting  as  a  translator.  As  he  suggested,  ‘the  skill  we’re  bringing  is  
that  we’re   listening   to  what   they   [the   client]   say…   the   trick   is   to   translate   that   into  
something  which   is   buildable,   and  gives   them  what   they  want   but   also   gives   you,  
you  know,   something   that   you   think   is   a   piece   of   good  design’   [emphasis   added].  
The  act  of   translation   is  neither  a  passive  activity  nor   reducible   to  any  determinate  
subject/object  but,  rather,  as  the  architect,  above,  hinted,  it  provides  the  possibility  for  
indeterminate   things   to   occur,   including   building   outcomes   not   necessarily  
commensurate  with  original  client  briefings.    
  
The   evidence   presented   here   indicates   that   the   possibility   for   architects   to   practice  
autonomously,   or   exercising   a   sense   of   self   in   the   field,   is   interlocked   with   the  
languages,   values,   and   socio-­‐‑cultural   dispositions,   of   other   project   professionals  
involved   in   the  development   and  design  process.52  This  observation   resonates  with  
Tony  Fry’s53understanding  that  the  freedom  ‘to  be’  and  ‘to  do’  depends  upon  ‘acts  of  
appropriation   and   recognition’   by   others,   or   the   mutuality   of   autonomy   and  
dependence   as   a   basis   of   sociality.   By   this,   Fry54  is   suggesting   that   ‘in   so   far   as  we  
gain  freedom  ‘to  be’,  our  being  gains  this  possibility’   from  interactions  with  others,  
and  the  manifold  contexts  in  which  such  interactions,  as  practice,  unfold.    
  
(b).  ‘Multiplying  the  variations’  by  embodying  the  building.  
  
	   17	  
A  significant  part  of  the  socialisation  of  architects  relates  to  an  abstract  sense  of  place  
that   is   rarely   populated   by   specific   subjects.   Rather,   the   social   sense   of   space   is  
described  by  the  use  of  euphemisms,  such  as  ‘the  user’  or  ‘the  occupier’,  but  rarely  in  
relation  to  individual  subjects  or  persons  that  resemble  living  human  beings.  In  part,  
this  is  conditioned  by  the  nature  of  the  capitalist  land  market  and  its  propensity  for  
speculative   building   in  which   space   is   conceived   as   abstract   Cartesian   coordinates,  
that,   for   Bachelard55  leads   to   the   loss   of   the   ‘tonalization   of   being’.56  Architectural  
discourse   augments   this   by   reducing   the   complexity   of   space   to   a   visual   form,  
understood,  and  experienced,  through  visuality  and  the  eye’s  appropriation  of  place.  
A  potential  implication  is  the  (re)  production  of  mono-­‐‑sensual  spatialities,  or  places  
rendered  less  than  sensitive  to  the  manifold  ways  in  which  bodies  (inter)  act  in  space.  
  
Our  argument  is  that  architects’  abstract,  disembodied,  conceptions  of  space,  do  not  
provide  the  latitude  for  them  to  self-­‐‑express  beyond  delimited  boundaries,  and  this  
forecloses   the   possibilities   of   developing   an   understanding   of   space   as   ‘something  
that  is  always  potential,  never  complete,  and  never  perfect’.57    By  breaking  down  the  
hierarchies  between  architect  and  user,  and  seeking  to  (re)  embody  the  former  within  
design   and   building   practices,   new   architectural   possibilities   emerge   that   may  
provide  the  basis  for  architects’  to  self  express  in  ways  whereby  the  possibilities  for  
an  ‘inhabited  geometry’  may  emerge.58  While  such  inhabitation  is  manifestly  part  of  a  
building’s  design,  particularly  the  shaping  of  it  through  time  by  occupation  and  use,  
it  is  a  rarity  for  architects  to  articulate  the  complexities  of  people’s  corporeal  presence  
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in  space,  or  the  ways  in  which  such  presence  is  constitutive  of  the  designed  nature  of  
buildings.  
  
An  example  of  seeking  to  embody  design,  and  enlarge  the  scope  of  an  architectural  
project,   was   evident   in   New   Haven   Downs   House,   a   place   comprising   two-­‐‑day  
centres  and  a  50-­‐‑bed  nursing  home  for  frail  elderly  people  and  people  with  learning  
difficulties   (see   figure   1).   The   architect   outlined   his   design   philosophy:   ‘We   are  
interested  in  the  kind  of  shared  project,  rather  than  in  delivering  a  carefully  wrought  
precious  object  from  a  long  way  away.  It  becomes  a  way  of  working  out  the  different  
and  varied  possibilities,  it  gives  us  so  much  more  to  work  on’.    For  the  architect,  the  
sharing  and  the  engagement  was  opening  up  his  autonomy  precisely  by  a  process  of  
de-­‐‑centring   that   enabled   otherwise   abstract   users   to   be   known   and   embodied  
persons.   The   process   of   embodiment   was   the   recognition   of   individuals’   personal  
biographies,   their   needs,   desires,   and   feelings,   or   what   the   architect   described   as  
‘letting  each  person  into  the  process,  sharing  their  lives  with  us,  and  giving  us  time  to  
spend  with  them  in  their  environment’.    
  
Figure  1  here:  New  Haven  Downs  House  
  
Source:  Reproduced  with  the  kind  permission  of  Sue  Barr  
  
His   knowledge   of   dementia   was   opened   up   by   personal   encounters   and,   as   he  
recounted,  ‘I’ve  been  on  walking  trips  in  the  Lake  District  with  some  of  the  residents,  
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as  one  of   them,  and  so   it’s   [i.e.  designing]  more   than  a  desk  exercise  or   replicating  
previous  buildings’.  The  architect  saw  these  encounters  as  much  more  than  gathering  
information   but   rather   as   a   constituent   part   of   [his]   self-­‐‑learning   to   enable   an  
embodied   architecture   to   evolve.   As   he   said,   ‘our   role   is   far   greater   than   making  
assisted   bathrooms   to   be   a   particular   shape   and   size…[it’s]   how   the   body   should  
move   through   space   and  what   the   implications   of   that   space   are   on   the   self…We  
need  to  constantly  be  wondering  and  talking  about  that,  about  what  it  means  to  be  in  
those   spaces’.   By   walking   around   places   with   people   with   dementia,   and   talking  
with  them  about   their  sense  of  space,   the  outcome  was  the  production  of   ‘localised  
geographies’   by   de-­‐‑scaling   the   building   to   ensure   that   every   part  was   legible   and  
easy  to  interpret.  
  
The  architect  felt  that  the  project  was  a  challenge  to  the  ‘tried  and  tested’  approaches  
to  the  spatialising  of  design,  or  the  formulaic  ways  reflected  in  much  of  his  previous  
work.  As  he  said,   ‘it  all  became  very  contextual  and  very  specific,   it  challenged  my  
thinking,   and   it   made   me   approach   the   work   very   differently’.   The   embodied  
knowledges  of  dementia  that   the  architect  developed  suggested  the  need  to  change  
the   client’s  brief  with   its   emphasis  on   fixity  of  design  and   the  allocation  of  uses   to  
specific  rooms  or  parts  of  the  building.  As  the  architect  noted,  ‘I  learnt  that  residents  
don’t   take   note   of   conventional   design,   so  we  mixed   it   all   up’.   Instead   of   separate  
spaces,  such  as  a  living  room  and  dining  room,  ‘we  said  wouldn’t  it  be  better  if  there  
were  several  sitting  areas  and  several  dining  areas,  more  or   less  as   interchangeable  
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environments…we  made  the  dining  areas  destinations  at  the  end  of  corridors,  so  you  
never  came  to  a  dead  end,  you  always  came  to  a  light  bright  public  room’.  
  
Observations  by  the  architect  indicate  that  the  designed  outcomes  were  based  on  an  
embodied   method   of   knowing   that   was   much   more   than   pre-­‐‑reflexive   bodily  
engagements  with,  or  knowledges  of,  cognitive  disorders  and  the  materiality  of  care  
home  environments.  As  he  said,  the  approach  is  a  ‘free  thinking  ideology  where  one  
kind  of  dispenses  with  the  rule  book...to  how  the  body  should  move  through  space  
and  what   the   implications   of   that   space   are   on   the   self’.   The  method   reflected   the  
intertwined   ways   in   which   the   architect   became   immersed   into   the   embodied,  
practical,  worlds  of  dementia  and  design,  and,  as  he  said,  ‘until  I  met  these  people,  I  
did  not  quite   realise  how   they   saw   the  world  or   sensed   the   spaces   that   they  move  
around  and  live  in.  Here,  the  architect’s  capacity  to  know,  and  his  subsequent  scope  
for   practice,   or   the   application   of   the   relational   ‘autonomous   self’,   depended  upon  
both  the  physical  and  emotional  interactions  between  himself  and  the  care  setting,  in  
which  ‘the  experience  was  one  where  you  kind  of  learn  to  be  more  focussed  on  the  
person.’  
  
The   architect’s   approach   to   the   design   of   the   care   home   is   also   one   which  
acknowledges   the   interdependencies   between   spaces,   or   what   Schneider   and   Till  
refer  to  as  the  ‘continuity  of  action  and  occupation’.59  This  views  all  agents  involved  
in   the   production   and   use   of   a   building   as   entwined   in   a   ‘temporal   chain’,   and  
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requires   that   architects  must   always   be   ‘alert   to   events   further   down   the   line   over  
which   they  have  some  (but  not   total)  inﬂuence’.60  Noting   the   partiality   of   architects’  
influence   over   building   form   and   function   in   this  way   need   not   be   viewed   as   the  
diminution  of  their  status  or  selfhood,  or  truncation  of  autonomous  practice.  Rather,  
we  suggest  that  adopting  an  embodied,  decentred,  approach  to  design,  as  described  
by   the   architect   of   the   care   home,   is   integral   to   the   co-­‐‑creation   of   knowledge   and  
understanding  about  form  and  function  that  is  necessary  for  the  flourishing  of  design  
practitioners.  
  
(c).  Regulating  design  and  the  enhancement  of  (relational)  autonomy.  
  
It   is  not  only  human  agents  that  exert  an  influence  over  the  production  of   the  built  
environment,   and   the   rules   and   regulations   that   govern   design   practice,   such   as  
planning   and   building   regulations,   are   a   co-­‐‑constitutive   part   of   the   actions   of  
architects.61    The  commonly  held  view  is  that  regulation  and  rule  relating  to  design  is  
an  external   imposition   that  will   reduce   the   scope  of  architects’   creativity.  A   typical  
observation  was  made   by   the  American   architect   Frank   Lloyd  Wright,   who   noted  
that   ‘codes   are   the   mental   limitations   of   short   men,   short   of   experience,   short   of  
imagination,  short  of  courage,  short  of  common  sense…’62  There  is  no  end  of  similar  
statements  to  be  found  in  the  architectural  press.  In  an  exchange  in  Building  Design,  it  
is   claimed   that   regulations   relating   to   disabled   people’s   access   to   buildings   are  
‘stifling  development’,63  while,  in  a  related  piece,  the  magazine’s  editor  refers  to  the  
‘regulatory  straitjacket’  that  ‘demands  that  architects  only  use  certain  kinds  of  locks’64.  
	   22	  
In   contrast   to   these,   sometimes   caricatured,   observations,   we   suggest   that   the  
regulations  and  rules  governing  design  can  facilitate  a  liberalisation,  or  opening  up,  
of   practice,   in   ways   whereby   opportunities   for   creative   engagement   may   be  
enhanced.65  Regulation  is  not  reducible  to  a  technical,  instrumental,  object  per  se,  but,  
instead,   it   is   a   socio-­‐‑material   construct   embedded   into   a   complexity   of   knowledge  
of/about   building   and   construction.   Its   enacting   is   always   part   of   place-­‐‑based  
practices.  While   design   regulation   states   a   rule   to   be   followed,   the   rule,   in   and   of  
itself,  is  always  part  of  an  interpretative  process  and  its  shaping  of  outcomes  is  never  
pre-­‐‑defined   or   determined.   Our   research   highlights   architects’   complex,   and  
sometimes   surprising,   relationships  with   regulatory   requirements,   and  shows  how,  
in  practice,   regulation  may  enable  a  widening  of   the  possibilities  of  what  architects  
can  achieve.    
  
An  example  is  architects’  interactions  with  Part  L  of  the  English  building  regulations  
relating   to   the   conservation   of   fuel   and   power.66  This   regulation   appeared   in   1995,  
and   sets   energy   efficiency   requirements   for   new   and   old   buildings,   including  
measures   to   ensure   that   targets   to   reduce   CO2   emissions   are   met.   The   Part   L  
regulation  has  prompted  discussion  in  the  design  and  construction  industry  about  its  
impact   on   a   range   of   practices,   including   procurement   and   design   team   decision-­‐‑
making,   innovation   in  design,  and  compliance.67  While  much  of   the   focus  relates   to  
costs  of  adhering  to  Part  L,  and  its  capacity   to  reduce  the  use  of  glass   in  buildings,  
one  of  our  interviewees  felt  that  it  offers,  like  all  regulations,  ‘opportunities  perhaps,  
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as   well’.   Another   architect   concurred   in   noting   that   ‘the   good   thing   about   the  
regulation   is   that   it   is   to   do   with   insulating   buildings   or   making   buildings   more  
sustainable,   you   can’t   argue   that   that’s   not   a   sensible   direction   to   be  moving…the  
regulation,  you  might  argue,  is  in  some  ways  liberating’.  
  
Some  architects  felt  that  Part  L  was  empowering  them  by  providing  a  legal  remit  to  
pursue   innovation   in   design   that   previously   was   ‘off   limits’   or   not   welcomed   or  
countenanced  by  clients.  In  one  practice,  committed  to  green  design  solutions,  Part  L  
has  been  ‘a  godsend…it’s  making  it  easier  for  us  to  influence  the  client’.  For  another  
architect,  less  concerned  with  green  issues,  Part  L  was  opening  up  design  practice  to  
new  possibilities.  As  he  said,  ‘we  do  a  lot  of  very  glassy,  light  work,  an  awful  lot  of  
which   is   going   to   be   very,   very   difficult   to   do.   You   know,  we’re   going   to   have   to  
really  re-­‐‑think  things’.  For  the  architect,  the  rethinking  was  one  whereby  potential  for  
new  and  exciting  design  is  made  possible  by  the  legal  rule  despite,   in  this  instance,  
the   client’s   reluctance   to   pay   what   are   perceived   as   additional   costs   for   energy  
efficient  design:  ‘we’re  [architects]  there  but  our  clients  aren’t  necessarily  up  with  it,  
and  they’re,  well,   ‘why  do  we  have  to  do  this?’  And  of  course  the  attitude  is,   ‘well,  
how  can  we  get  round  it?’’  
  
Other   architects   saw  Part  L   as,  potentially,   a  productive  part   of   a  project   brief.  An  
architect  described   a  project   for   a  UK  higher   education   institution   in  which  Part  L  
was   facilitating  what   he   described   as   ‘more   interesting   spatial   arrangements’   than  
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would  otherwise  have  been  achievable  within  the  project  brief.  He  gave  an  example  
of  dramatic  internal  atria  that  he  had  incorporated  into  the  design  of  the  building,  in  
part,   to   facilitate   the   flow   of   air  within   the   building   necessary   to  meet   ventilation  
requirements.   The   architect   described   how   Part   L   had   been   used   to   help   ‘sell’   his  
design  approach  to  the  client.  He  was  of  the  view  that  telling  the  client  that  the  atria  
would   create  a   ‘better  building’  would  not  have   carried   sufficient  weight   to   justify  
the  additional  cost.  Instead,  he  was  able  to  justify  what  may  have  been  dismissed  as  a  
luxurious  use  of  space  by  showing  how  it  added  value  both  in  design  and  function  
terms,  and,  crucially,  in  meeting  statutory  air  ventilation  standards.  
  
The  example  shows  how  regulation  is  a  constitutive  part  of  the  content  of  design  and  
how  it  may  be   implicated   in  enabling  what   the  architect  outlined  as   ‘an   innovative  
approach,  material  or   spatial   configuration’.  This  observation   takes  one  away   from  
the  scenario  that  ‘architects  depend’,  or  that  the  scope  for  (their)  acting  is  inhibited,  
necessarily,   by   broader   social   structures   and   relations.   A   relational   view   of   action  
conceives   architects’   interactions   with   social   structures,   such   as   the   building  
regulations,  as  contextual  and  indeterminate,  and  providing  the  possibilities  for  ways  
of  acting  that  are  not  a  foreclosure  or  predictability  of  outcome.  The  paradox  is  that  
while   regulation,  as   legal   fiat  or   rule  of   law,  appears   to  be   the  basis  of   restraint,  or  
one’s   unfreedom   or   capacity   not   to   do,   they   reflect   Levinas’s   observation   that   ‘we  
must  impose  commands  on  ourself  in  order  to  be  free’.68  
  





Much  of  the  debate  about  architecture  and  autonomy  continues  to  revolve  around  an  
unproductive  either/or  position  that,  we  feel,   is  unhelpful   in  seeking  to  understand  
how  the  practices  of  architects  are  crafted  and  (re)  produced.  On  the  one  hand,  there  
are  still  those  who  proclaim  that  architecture  is  able  to  forge  an  identity,  and  modus  
operandi,  more  or  less  independently  of  socio-­‐‑cultural  and  political  contexts,  while,  
on   the   other   hand,   there   are   some   individuals,   such   as   Robbins,  who   suggest   that  
‘nothing  could  be  less  autonomous  than  architecture’.69    We  reject  both  positions,  the  
former  because  of  its  fundamentally  idealist,  and  idealistic,  nature,  the  latter  because  
it  provides   little   scope   for  an  understanding  of  how  actors,   such  as  architects,  may  
influence   social   actions   and   outcomes   through   the   context   of   practice.   Thus,   for  
Robbins70  to   suggest   that   dependence   on   social   forces   is   ‘setting   the   limits   and   the  
agendas’   of   architecture   is   to   perpetuate   no   more   than   a   deterministic   frame   of  
understanding  of  the  actions  of  architects71.  
  
By  drawing  on  relational  accounts  of  social  action,  including  the  works  of  Christman,  
Gondalsonas,   Nedelsky,   and   Brown,   the   either/or   representations   of   architects’  
actions,  that  lend  themselves  to,  and  even  encourage,  reducibility  to  one  side  of  the  
autonomy/dependence   dualism,   are,   potentially,   avoided.   Instead,   a   relational  
account  makes  it  possible  to  transform  an  understanding  of  the  practices  of  architects  
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into  ones  whereby  the  emphasis  is  the  co-­‐‑constructed  and  conjoined  nature  of  design  
practice.   Such   co-­‐‑construction   is   the   interplay  of   agency  and   structure,  human  and  
non-­‐‑human   actors,   and   part   of   processes   that,   in   Fry’s   terms,   ‘points   to   the  
determinate  designing  consequences  of   situated   ‘things’’.72  Here,   the  understanding  
is   that   architects’   dependence,   or   their   ‘socially   constituted   and   interpersonally  
embedded  selves’,  shapes  the  scope  for  autonomy  73.    In  other  words,  dependence  is  
integral  to  the  social  relations  that  comprise  the  conditions  of  autonomous  activities  
and  practices.  
  
The  autonomy  of  architects  can  be  enhanced  by  recognising  their  dependence  on  the  
social  conditions,  and  contexts,  that  frame  their  actions,  and  by  developing  a  politics  
of  practice  that  enables  the  relational  resources  necessary  for  autonomous  actions  to  
be   secured.   For   Schneider   74,   this  may   require   architecture   to   be   reconfigured   and  
rethought  as  a  ‘field  of  questions  and  uncertainties’,  by  challenging  what  she  regards  
as  the  insular  nature  of  the  profession,  and  its  adherence  to  accreditation  procedures,  
educational   regimes   and   introspective   methods   of   valuing   and   judging   design  
quality.  Such  views  suggest  that  the  creation  of  the  relationally  autonomous  architect  
is  predicated  on  the  dissolution  of  architecture  as  a  delimited  or  disciplinary  field,  in  
which  architects  are  exposed  to,  and  integrated  into,  the  totality  of  building  cultures,  
or   what   Frank   Lloyd   Wright   referred   to   as   designing   ‘from   the   nature   of  
construction’.75  
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While   some   may   perceive   suggestions   of   a   dissolution   or   dilution   of   the  
disciplinarity  standing  of  the  architect  as  a  pessimistic  diagnosis  for  the  future  of  the  
profession,  we   argue   that   the   opposite   is   the   case.      Instead,   it   is   in   acknowledging  
and,  moreover  embracing,  the  inter-­‐‑disciplinary  and  collaborative  nature  of  the  design  
and   production   of   the   built   environment,   that   the   future   of   the   architectural  
professional  lies.      As  the  empirical  examples  we  have  reviewed  in  this  paper  suggest,  
the  skill  of  the  architect  is  in  being  attuned  to,  and  then  interpreting  and  translating,  
the  plethora  of  (non)human  elements  that  shape  design  practice.    This  could  include  
a   creative   response   to   a   challenging   client   brief,   being   anticipatory   of/sensitive   to  
end-­‐‑user  needs,  and  working  with  (rather  than  against)  codes  and  regulations.    
  
As   much   is   acknowledged   in   a   recent   review   of   architecture   and   the   built  
environment   in   the   UK,   where   the   theme   of   inter-­‐‑disciplinarity   is   recurrent,   and  
which  positions  architecture  as   something   ‘that   is  owned  by  everyone,  and  created  
by   many,   not   just   architects’   (75).      Such   a   viewpoint   goes   someway   to   towards  
recognising   the   social   embeddedness   of   architectural   practice,   in  which,   ‘in   reality,  
[architects]  are  now  seen  as   team  members  rather   than   leaders,  alongside  the  many  
parallel   professions   like   project   management,   planning   and   cost   consultancy,  
surveying  and  landscape  design’  (76).  
  
(75,  76)  Farrell  Review,  p.65  and  p.14.  
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